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International Law and the Use of Force:
America’s Response to September 11
Muna Ndulo
The September 11 terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon shocked the world
and drew universal condemnation. The following
day, the United Nations General Assembly passed a
resolution that strongly condemned the attacks and
urged international cooperation to bring those
responsible to justice.1 On September 12, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 1368,2 which
unequivocally condemned the terrorist acts and
characterized them as a threat to international
peace.3
Despite international agreement on the attacks’
heinousness, debates ensued regarding an appropri-
ate response, specifically in terms of the kind of
actions permissible under international law. Other
controversial issues include how to prosecute those
who planned and ordered the
aggression and whether to
classify these acts as war,
terrorism, or crimes against
humanity. The answers to
these questions are important
in determining the legality of
the United States’ response,
which began on October 7 as an assertion of the
right of self-defense in the form of military action
in Afghanistan that was designed to destroy the
infrastructure and personnel of Al Qaeda, the ter-
rorist network that America  holds responsible for
the devastation of September 11. This article exam-
ines the use of force in international law and its
application to recent events.
The Use of Force under the
United Nations Charter
The creation of the United Nations signaled a
remarkable move to entrust decisions concerning
the use of force and efforts to maintain interna-
tional peace and security to a multinational
institution. Following the carnage of World War
II, the United Nations Charter of 1945 introduced
the notion of a general prohibition on the unilat-
eral use of force by sovereign states4 and called for
the peaceful settlement of disputes.5 The Charter
gives the Security Council the primary responsibil-
ity for maintaining international peace and
security, and of identifying threats to international
peace.6 If such a threat is apparent, the Security
Self-defense includes the right both to repel an armed
attack and to take the war to the aggressor state
in order to prevent renewed aggression.
Council can authorize the use of sanctions against
the aggressor state.7 If the Security Council deems
sanctions or other non-military measures inad-
equate, it may authorize the use of force as a last
resort to help maintain international peace and
security.8
Besides prohibiting the unilateral use of force,
the Charter explicitly authorizes the use of force in
self-defense. Article 51 provides that “Nothing in
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the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken mea-
sures necessary to maintain international peace and
security.”9 Thus, self-defense includes the right
both to repel an armed attack and to take the war
to the aggressor state in order to prevent renewed
aggression.
As defined in Article 51, the right of self-defense
envisages a situation in which a state has perpe-
trated an armed attack against another state. It is
doubtful, however, that this conception includes an
attack perpetrated by non-state actors unless their
actions can be attributed to a state. Also, the right
of self-defense is predicated on an “armed attack,”
making the definition of “armed attack” highly
relevant and—perhaps inevitably—hotly disputed.
The U.S. itself has interpreted “armed attack” to
include certain terrorist activities. Following the
1988 bombing of PanAm flight 103, President
Reagan described the U.S.’s subsequent attacks on
Libya as fully consistent with Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter. However, one should
note that the bombing of Libya was widely con-
demned and the U.S.’s claimed
justification for the action gener-
ally rejected by U.N. member
states.
Conversely, one can argue
that targeting entities in charge
of or directly engaged in an
armed attack, including non-state
actors, is a permissible measure of self-defense
under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.10 On this
basis, a military mission to capture and arrest those
ordering and/or directly engaged in an ongoing
program of demonstrated hostility would also be
permissible under the Charter as an act of self-
defense, for lending support to terrorists who
attack another state is effectively a use of force
against both the territorial integrity and political
independence of that state.
Necessity vs. Proportionality
There are two qualifications to the use of force in
self-defense: necessity and proportionality. “Neces-
sity” means that the need of self-defensive action
must be immediate and overwhelming, leaving no
possibility of choosing among alternative means
and no moment for deliberation.11 The rule of
proportionality prohibits excessive use of force, in
the sense of the old adage that one must not ward
off a fist fight with a gun. As Secretary-General
Kofi Annan remarked several years ago, “We must
fight terrorism and do our utmost to banish it
from the face of the earth. But the force we use to
fight should always be proportional and focused
on the actual terrorists. We cannot fight them by
using their own method of inflicting indiscrimi-
nate violence and terror on innocent civilians,
including children.”12
Various sources of international law provide
further insight into what constitutes excessive
force. For example, in 1966, the International
Court of Justice held that “States must never make
civilians the object of attack and must conse-
quently never use weapons that are incapable of
The terrorist attacks of September 11 pose the legal
dilemma of how to respond proportionally when the
initial attack was itself unreasonable and excessive.
distinguishing between civilian and military tar-
gets.”13 The terrorist attacks of September 11 pose,
therefore, the legal dilemma of how to respond
proportionally when the initial attack was itself
unreasonable and excessive, particularly in its
having been intentionally directed at civilians.14
Nevertheless, to hold an entire nation accountable
for the acts of a few does not appear to be lawful,
for collective punishment would, by definition,
entail the unjustifiable suffering of innocent
populations.
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This stricture is especially pertinent to the phe-
nomenon of state-sponsored terrorism. Individual
terrorists perpetrated the September 11 acts but
they could not have done so without a state provid-
ing them sanctuary and logistical support. The
U.S. has claimed that it has strong and compelling
evidence that implicates Afghanistan in the
September 11 attacks. Assuming this evidence is
convincing, one must decide whether or not
Afghanistan is liable for the acts of Al Qaeda. For
Afghanistan to be liable, the evidence must show
that Al Qaeda acted under its authority or that
the Taliban regime was part of the Al Qaeda
conspiracy.
If the September 11 attacks can be attributed to
Afghanistan, an application of the law leaves no
doubt that the U.S. has suffered an armed attack
that entitles it to exercise self-defense against
Afghanistan. It should also be noted that Article 51
requires a state exercising its right of self-defense to
report the measures it has taken to the Security
Council. In a letter to the President of the Security
Council, dated October 7,15 the United States
reported that, in response to the September 11
attacks and in accordance with all states’ inherent
right to individual and collective self-defense, the
U.S. armed forces were initiating actions designed
to prevent and deter further attacks on its territory
and interests. These actions would include military
strikes against Al Qaeda terrorist training camps
and military installations of the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan.16 Although the United States is en-
titled under international law to use force to punish
those responsible for the armed attacks committed
against it, international support for American
action will be greater if the facts pointing to the
entities responsible for the terrorism of September
11 become clearer.
Questions inevitably have arisen about the
proportionality of the campaign against Afghani-
stan—especially because the campaign has covered
the entire country. Even more questions would
arise should the United States choose to extend the
campaign to Iraq and other nations that the United
States perceives as supporting terrorism. Such an
extension would beg the questions of what specific
armed attacks those countries were involved in to
justify the United States’ exercise of self-defense




Because Article 51 preserves the inherent right of
individual state or collective self-defense against an
armed attack, Security Council authorization is not
necessary for actions permitted by the theory of
The United Nations Security Council
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self-defense. Notably, however, this right continues
only until the Security Council has taken the mea-
sures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. One view holds that the aggrieved state
and its friends and allies may decide for themselves
to exercise their rights of individual and collective
self-defense until either peace is restored or the
Security Council, by its own affirmative vote,
decides that self-defense has gone too far and has
itself become a threat to international peace.17 A
countervailing view argues that when the Security
Council assumes jurisdiction, the injured party’s
right to self-defense is suspended until the Council
affirmatively decides it cannot deal effectively with
the problem.18 A third view opines that the cus-
tomary law of self-defense is not abridged in any
way by the Charter and remains intact until the
Security Council has dealt successfully with the
controversy. Yet another view is that Article 51 is
not an affirmative grant of a right of self-defense
but a description of circumstances in which the
exercise of an “inherent right” is not precluded by
the Charter.19 Those circumstances, however, are
subject to a temporal limit; they
endure only until the Security
Council has taken measures to
maintain peace and security.20
In practice, it does not matter
which interpretation of Article
51 one adopts, for each of the
five permanent members of the
Security Council hold veto power in any Council
vote.21 With respect to the present military opera-
tion against Afghanistan, any action by the United
Nations Security Council that does not accord with
American plans will almost certainly attract an
American veto. In addition, should the Security
Council take any action, the question of whether
the measures are sufficient to maintain interna-




The events of September 11 have demonstrated
more than ever the need for a coordinated inter-
national response to terrorism. The events showed
that innovations in global communications have
given international standing to some local terrorist
groups, while terrorist organizations with global
reach use rapid international transportation to hit,
run, and hide. In addition, perpetrators of terror-
ism in one country frequently use other states as
safe havens or for fund-raising, sometimes hiding
among emigrée diaspora communities. They may
receive training abroad and use foreign countries
for staging terrorist acts or as launching bases for
their operations elsewhere. Some terrorist organi-
zations are engaged partly in legitimate trade, and
others in drugs and weapons smuggling. Most
do not operate in a vacuum but rather alongside
non-violent militant groups pursuing the same
objectives by peaceful means. Terrorist organiza-
tions are global entities; they permeate all
jurisdictions. The fight against terrorism cannot
succeed without commensurate international co-
operation and strategic insights into terrorist
operations. The international community should
adopt and enforce existing conventions on terror-
ism, and must work toward the elaboration of a
comprehensive treaty to deal with this scourge.22
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373,
adopted by the Security Council on September 28,
is a good start toward such a comprehensive
treaty.23 It is a wide-ranging resolution that calls
on all states both to prevent and suppress the
The fight against terrorism cannot succeed
without commensurate international cooperation
and strategic insights into terrorist operations.
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financing of terrorism and to criminalize the willful
provisioning or collection of funds for such acts. It
also calls on states to freeze the funds, assets, and
economic resources of persons who commit or
attempt to commit terrorist acts, and of persons
and entities who act on behalf of terrorists. Fur-
ther, the Resolution calls on states to prohibit
nationals, persons or entities in their territories
from making funds, financial assets, economic
resources, financial or other related services avail-
able to persons who commit or attempt to commit,
facilitate or participate in the commission of terror-
ist acts. According to the Resolution, states must
also refrain from providing any form of support to
entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, take
the necessary steps to prevent the commission of
terrorist acts, and deny safe haven to those who
finance, plan, support, and commit terrorist acts.
Significantly, Security Council Resolution
1373 is binding on all U.N. member states; it
was adopted under Chapter Seven of the United
Nations Charter, which authorizes the Security
Council to take measures to maintain international
peace and security. The primary difficulty with
Resolution 1373 is that it does not provide com-
mon legislative and enforcement standards. For
example, the Resolution does not define what
constitutes a “severe punishment” for a terrorist
act, or at what point a state is doing “all in its
power” to stop terrorists from operating in its
territory.
In spite of these omissions, Security Council
Resolution 1373 can form the basis of a compre-
hensive treaty because it identifies major factors
that facilitate terrorist operations. An ideal compre-
hensive treaty would also provide the following:
extradition measures that would ensure the appre-
hension and prosecution of terrorists, wherever
they might reside; punitive standards by which the
international community could hold states that
harbor terrorists accountable; financial regulations
that would make the financing of terrorist activities
difficult; and facilitated international information
exchange regarding terrorist activities.
What Else is Needed
to Combat Terrorism?
Whatever the world does in response to terrorist
violence, its measures should not entail harsh secu-
rity controls that tend to undermine civil liberties
and international freedom. At the same time, the
world should ensure that those who commit acts of
terrorism are put on trial in accordance with the
principles of law. The tragic events of September
11 should not lead to more prejudice or tolerance
of prejudice in an already too-prejudiced world.
The international community must redouble its
efforts to eradicate poverty, inequality, and armed
conflicts throughout the world, for these factors
create the perfect breeding grounds for terrorists.
Such efforts would entail the development and
advocacy of socio-economic policies, framed under
the auspices of the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organiza-
tion, that reduce the inclination to engage in
heinous violence for ideological reasons. In short,
the political grievances that give terrorists a con-
stituency must be addressed and, to some degree,
resolved.
Every effort must be made to rid the world of
dictatorial and undemocratic regimes. Corruption,
for instance, facilitates the production of false and
forged documents, which are essential to the move-
ment of terrorists and the execution of their
murderous plans. Experience has taught the world
that pursuing effective action against criminal
organizations of every type is always more difficult
against a background of corruption and irrespon-
sible regimes. Thus, terrorism must be fought with
increased support for democratization programs,
judicial reform, conflict resolution, poverty allevia-
tion, economic reform, and health and education
enhancement programs.
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